

Obligatory presupposition and discourse management

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2.1 Contrast

2.1.1 Emphasis on similarity

- Hypothesized discourse function of *too*: To emphasize the similarity between contrasting constituents. (Kaplan, 1984)
- “I suggest that the obligatoriness of *too*, in a construction of the form *S1 and S2 too*, stems from *too*’s discourse function, which is to emphasize the similarity between members of a pair of contrasting items. The variability of *too*’s obligatoriness is a function of the degree prominence given to the pair of contrasting constituents, concerning which predication is made by *too*. The greater the prominence, the greater the need for *too* to state the unity between the contrasting elements.” (Kaplan, 1984, p.516)

2.1.2 Distinctiveness constraint

- (1) Peter invited Pia for dinner, **too (Krifka, 1999)

- Two elements for Krifka (1999)’s proposal:
 1. the distinction between two types of accent, the focus accent, and the contrastive topic accent (following Büring (1998)’s work and the classical distinction from Jackendoff (1972) between A and B accents in English)
 2. the existence of an implicature, derived from a distinctiveness constraint

- (2) a. A: What did Peter eat?
 b. B: Peter ate **pasta
 c. B’: * Peter ate pasta
- (3) a. A: What did Peter and Pia eat?
 b. B: * Peter ate **pasta
 c. B’: **Peter ate pasta

Büring (1998) has shown that answers in which there is a topic accent are answers which leave open a number of questions. So for instance, in (3), the question of what Pia ate is left open. According to Büring (1998), such uses of the topic accent are subject to a constraint called condition of disputability. Krifka claims that another constraint comes with contrastive answers, what he calls the distinctiveness constraint, which is defined as follows:

- (4) If [...*T*...*C*...] is a contrastive answer to a question, then there is no alternative *T'* of *T* such that the speaker is willing to assert [...*T'*...*C*...].

A sketch of the reasoning

- There are 2 (contrastive) topics in the context.

- (5) What did Peter and Pia eat ?

- The utterance of a simple sentence with a CT accent on the subject triggers a distinctiveness constraint:

- (6) a. — Péter ate pàsta
 b. $\therefore$ there is no $T' \neq \text{Peter}$ such that T' ate pasta.

- the utterance of a 2 simple sentence with a CT accent is in contradiction with the previous implicature

- (7) a. ... and Píà ate pàsta
 b. $\therefore$ there is a $T' \neq \text{Peter}$ such that T' ate pasta.

- The stressed additive particule acknowledges the violation of the constraint : “the semantics of *too* is such that it allows the violation of distinctiveness by explicitly stating a discourse relation” (Krifka, 1999)

- (8) Péter ate pàsta, and Píà ate pasta, tòò

2.2 Maximize Presupposition

2.2.1 Antipresupposition

- Maximize presupposition! Heim (1991)
- Implicated Presuppositions Sauerland (2006)
- Antipresupposition Percus (2006)

2.2.1.1 Excursus: Quantity Implicatures

- (9) a. John ate some cookies.
 b. $\therefore$ John didn't eat all the cookies.

- There is a lexical element belonging to a Horn-scale:

$$\langle \text{some}, \overbrace{\text{most, all}}^{\text{stronger alternatives}} \rangle$$

- Sentences formed with stronger alternatives would be more informative:

- (10) a. John ate all the cookies.
 b. John ate most cookies.
 c. $\rightarrow$ John ate some of the cookies

- A more informative sentence is relevant.
- The choice of a less informative sentence by the speaker leads to the conclusion that the speaker is reluctant to use a stronger sentence.

- [Epistemic step] the speaker is well-informed : if he is reluctant to use a sentence, that might be because it's not true.
- Implicature: (on the addressee's part):

(11) John didn't eat most cookies.

2.2.2 Heim's motto

- (12)
- a. #A wife of John's is intelligent
 - b. The wife of John's is intelligent
 - c. #A father of the victim arrived at the scene
 - d. The father of the victim arrived at the scene (Heim, 1991; Sauerland, 2003)

(13) "Scalar alternatives"

- a. ⟨ some, all ⟩ assertion
- b. ⟨ a, the ⟩ presupposition (Hawkins, 1978)

- Maximize Presupposition!:
make your contribution presuppose as much as possible

2.2.3 Presupposition and alternatives

- Abusch's proposal: derive presupposition from alternatives (Abusch, 2010)

- (14)
- a. {stop, continue}
 - b. {win, lose}
 - c. {be right, be wrong}
 - d. {know, be unaware}
- (15)
- a. x knows p
 - b. x knows p , x is unaware of p
- (16) $(p \text{ and } x \text{ believes } p) \text{ or } (p \text{ and } x \text{ doesn't believe } p) = p$
- (17)
- a. Jan stopped smoking at three.
 - b. Jan stopped smoking at three or he continued smoking at three. $\leftrightarrow$ Jan was smoking until three.
- (18)
- a. Jan won.
 - b. Jan won or Jan lost. $\leftrightarrow$ Jan participated.

- Sauerland's proposal: an implicated presupposition is derived exactly like a (scalar) implicature, but in the presuppositional domain.
- Implicated Presuppositions :
 - non factivity of *believe*

(19) John believes that 313 is prime.

 - non singularity of the plural

- (20) Tom's children must be well-behaved.
- (21) All parents are requested to check that their children have put their life jacket.
- non uniqueness and non duality of universal quantifier
- (22) a. #Every nose of Kai's is runny.
b. #Every cheek of Lina's is rosy.
- (23) a. The nose of Kai's is runny. b. Both cheeks of Lina's are rosy.
(Sauerland, 2006, ex(36))
- non imperative presupposition of French subjunctive
- (24) a. #Que tu sois prudent!
That you be-SUBJ cautious
b. Sois prudent!
Be-IMP cautious
- (25) Que votre Altesse soit prudente!
That your Highness be-Msubj cautious!
- Tense and other features (person, number, gender)

2.2.4 Percus' notion of antipresupposition

- (26) Mary knows that Jane is pregnant.
presupposes that Jane is pregnant
- (27) John is repairing the chair in Mary's living room.
presupposes that Mary has exactly one chair in her living room
- (28) John assigned the same exercise to both of Mary's students.
presupposes that Mary has exactly two students
- (29) Mary thinks that Jane is pregnant.
antipresupposes that Jane is pregnant
- (30) John is repairing a chair in Mary's living room.
antipresupposes that Mary has exactly one chair in her living room
- (31) John assigned the same exercise to all of Mary's students.
antipresupposes that Mary has exactly two students

- Is *believe* a presupposition trigger?

⇒ No: what is actually predicted is much weaker

- (32) General structure of the mechanism
 - a. Situation: A speaker utters a sentence S_1 . S_1 has an alternative sentence S_2 , constructed via one of the lexical scales given above so that: (i) the presupposition p_2 of S_2 is stronger than the presupposition p_1 of S_1 , (ii) their assertions are equivalent.

- b. Predicted inference: S_2 is infelicitous, i.e. the constraints on its presupposition p_2 are not met. (Chemla, 2008)

• Informally:

- S believes that p is not in the common ground
- if S thought that p is true, s/he would want to have it added to the CG (via accommodation)
- To add a proposition to the CG, one has to “convince” the addressee, i.e. to have “competence” and “authority”.

- (33) a. — I was happier before I stopped smoking.
 — So you used to smoke?
 b. — I was happier when the earth was flat.
 — Wait a minute !

- (34) Prediction of the Maximize Presupposition principle:

Situation: a speaker s utters a sentence S_1 . S_2 is an alternative sentence to S_1 ; S_2 asserts what S_1 asserts, but additionally presupposes p .

Predicted inference: $\neg B_S[p] \vee \neg B_s[\text{Auth}_s[p]]$

(Chemla, 2008, (24))

- (35) Competence Assumption:
 The speaker s is opinionated about p .
 Technically: $B_S[p] \vee B_S[\neg p]$.

- (36) Authority Assumption:
 The speaker S believes in her authority about p .
 Technically: $B_S[\text{Auth}_s[p]]$.

2.2.5 A proposal


2.2.6 Hypothesis

- Extention of antipresupposition domain to new scales:

- (37) a. $\langle \text{a, the} \rangle, \langle \text{each, the} \rangle, \langle \text{all, both} \rangle$ (Percus, 2006)
 b. $\langle \text{believe, know} \rangle, \langle \text{too, } \emptyset \rangle, \langle \text{again, } \emptyset \rangle, \langle \text{whether, that} \rangle \dots$

2.2.7 Implementation

- (38) a. John is sick, Mary is sick too
 b. Mary is sick too $\rightarrow$ Mary is sick
 c. $(A \wedge P) \rightarrow A$
 d. $A \rightsquigarrow \neg(A \wedge P)$
 e. $\neg P$ = No one else than Mary (in the appropriate context) is sick



2.2.8 Discussion

- (39) Jean est malade, Marie est malade, Paul est malade, tout le monde est malade alors !
John is sick, Marie is sick, Paul is sick, everybody is sick then!
- (40) Il était là hier, il est là aujourd'hui
He was there yesterday, he is there today

2.3 Discourse Management

- Maximise cohesion
 - Available cohesive devices have to be used...
 - ... to avoid unwanted quantity inferences
 - cohesion can be marked by pointing identity or differences
 - or by providing *meta-information about text production*
- (Eckard & Frenkel, 2012)*

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